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Abstract
Landsberger, et al. (2001) have identiﬁed optimal bidder behavior in ﬁrst-price private-value
auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge, and derived comparative-statics
predictions regarding the auctioneer’s expected revenue and the eﬃciency of the allocation.
The experiment reported here tests the behavioral components of these comparative-statics
predictions using the dual-market bidding procedure, which permits very powerful tests. The
results support the predictions that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they
learn they have the low value. Contrary to theory, buyers are inclined to bid less when they
learn they have the high value. Once information is revealed, bidders tend to move toward
better responses, exploiting new economic opportunities. Consistent with theory, the overall
proportion of eﬃcient allocations is lower than in the ﬁrst-price auction before information is
revealed. But as a result of high-value bidders decreasing their bids, the expected revenue does
not increase on a regular basis, contrary to the theory’s predictions.
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Traditional auction models assume that agents do not know how their valuations stand relative to
those of their rivals, with knowledge limited to the underlying distribution from which values are
drawn. In real-life situations, this is often an unrealistic assumption since agents know more than
this. Such would be the case in art auctions where bidders might revise their bidding strategies based
on the participation of a wealthy art collector who is known to have a high valuation. Likewise, in
procurement auctions, due to experience accumulated, bidders learn who is the strongest bidder.
There is also a general perception that, in privatizations, ﬁrms already in the market or, in takeovers,
ﬁrms with related activities have a greater valuation than potential entrants or competing ﬁrms.1
The relevance of information revelation on bidding behavior is a common factor to all of these
examples although some of them use diﬀerent auction formats. Therefore, there is currently a
need to determine the impact of information revelation on bidding behavior in auction markets, on
seller’s revenue, and on the eﬃciency of the auction outcome.2
This paper reports an auction experiment in which two bidders are required to bid for a single
item following a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid allocation rule and under two diﬀerent information conditions.
While each bidder knows the value of the item to herself, the revelation of the valuation ranking
induces a particular asymmetric aﬃliation between bidders’ valuations.3
Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter and Zamir (2001) − hereafter referred to as LRWZ −
developed a theoretical model in which two bidders draw their values from the same distribution,
but the ranking of these valuations is common knowledge. Thus, the auction is ex-ante symmetric
since bidders’ valuations are drawn from a single density distribution. However, the revelation of
the rankings makes it asymmetric since the subsequent conditional distributions diﬀer.
The experiment reported here evaluates the key predictions of LRWZ’s model regarding the
1For instance, in the recent privatization of airwaves in the US, there was a general perception that the Paciﬁc
Telephone Company had a greater valuation for the Los Angeles area than did the other potential bidders. Another
example would be the auctioning of the third generation mobile phone license in the UK, where ﬁrms already in the
market were to have greater value for the new licenses being sold than potential entrants. Also, in the selling process
of Wellcome, a drug company, it was commonly known that Wellcome and Glaxo had particular synergies that made
Wellcome worth more to Glaxo than to any other competing ﬁrms (Klemperer, 2000).
2For a description of the importance of the issue of information revelation in auction markets, see Klemperer
(1999) and Wolfstetter (1996, 1999) for recent surveys in theoretical research, and Kagel (1995) for a recent survey
in experimental research.
3In auctions with aﬃliated private-values, values remain private for bidders, but the higher (lower) the value is
for one bidder, the more likely the value will be higher (lower) for other bidders as well (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
While for Milgrom and Weber (1982) the aﬃliation is among symmetric distributions of signals, this paper considers
am o d e li nw h i c ht h ea ﬃliation is among asymmetric distribution of signals.
2auctioneer’s expected revenue and the eﬃciency of the ﬁrst-price auction (FPA) institution in cases
where the ranking of valuations is common knowledge to two bidders: (i) The bidder with the lower
reservation value will bid more aggressively than the high-value bidder. Thus, the proportion of
eﬃcient allocations should be lower than when the bidders lack information about the ranking of
valuations. (ii) Bidders are expected to bid more aggressively than in the standard FPA model,
in which information regarding the ranking of valuations is not available. (iii)F o ran u m b e ro f
distributions, including the uniform distribution studied here, the expected revenue of sellers should
be higher when rankings are known than when they are unknown.
For the low-value bidder, the more aggressive bidding behavior is an immediate consequence of
knowing her position. Meanwhile, for the high-value bidder, the more aggressive bidding behavior
is a consequence of incorporating her expectations about the low-value bidder response into her
strategy. Notice that this behavior presumes a higher level of strategic thinking for the high-value
bidder. If the high-value bidder does not take the low-value bidder’s more aggressive bidding into
consideration, she might be tempted to keep bidding the same, or even less, in a misguided attempt
to take advantage of her higher valuation. Hence, the experiment tests these behavioral components
of the comparative-static predictions.
The experimental results support the prediction that low-value bidders are inclined to bid more
aggressively once information about the ranking of valuations has been revealed. Contrary to theory,
high-value bidders are inclined to bid less aggressively. However, in both cases bidders improve
their average surplus per auction. That is, high-value bidders are closer to best respond with
information revelation than without it. There are two (non mutually exclusive) ways to interpret
high-value bidders response after information is released: (i) A failure to take into account low-value
bidders’ responses to the revelation of the rankings. (ii) A reduction on bidders’ eﬀort to win the
item regardless of their valuations. Consistent with the theory, the overall proportion of eﬃcient
allocations is lower than in the ﬁrst-price auction before information is revealed. But as a result
of high-value bidders decreasing their bids, the expected revenue does not increase consistently.
Further, to the extent these results for high-value bidders go beyond the lab, they have strategic
implications for seller revenue when information about rankings is known.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the related auction literature. Section 3
describes the experimental design. Section 4 speciﬁes the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE)
bidding strategies for the auction models and states the comparative-statics predictions for the
3FPA when the information about the ranking of valuations is revealed. Section 5 evaluates the
experimental results regarding these auctions settings. Section 6 summarizes the research results.
2 Related Auction Literature
Experimental research on auctions has focused its eﬀort on testing important implications coming
from theory. These studies started by evaluating the predictions derived from the Independent
Private Value (IPV) auction model (Myerson, 1982; Riley and Samuelson, 1981): a single unit
auction under the assumptions of bidders’ risk neutrality, independence of bidders’ reservation
values and symmetry of bidders’ beliefs (Coppinger, Smith and Titus, 1980 and Cox, Robertson
and Smith, 1982). Closer to our research, Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) tested some predictions
derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982), regarding the impact of public information in the revenue
ranking among diﬀerent auctions institutions with aﬃliated private-values. In this case, bidders’
private values are no longer independent, but are still symmetric. Conversely, Pezanis (2000) and
G¨ uth, Ivanova-Stenzel and Wolfstetter (2001) concentrated on checking some of the revenue ranking
propositions between the second-price and ﬁrst-price auctions derived respectively by Maskin and
Riley (2000) and Plum (1992) with IPVs, but with values drawn from diﬀerent distributions.
We concentrate on evaluating the comparative statics predictions derived from an auction model
that relaxes simultaneously the assumptions of independence and symmetry (LRWZ, 2001). In
particular, this model considers an auction with ex-ante independent valuations from a single
density, but with ex-post aﬃliated valuations from diﬀerent conditional distributions once the
ranking of valuations is common knowledge.
3 Experimental Design
The experimental design used directly measures the information impact of the ranking of valuations
on bidding behavior in ﬁrst-price private-value auctions. The particulars of the experimental design
follow.
3.1 Structure of the Auction
Subjects in this experiment are required to bid for a single item following a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
allocation rule under two diﬀerent information conditions. In the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction,
4the high bidder earns a surplus equal to her value of the item less the high bid, while the other
subject earns nothing. In one information condition (hereafter referred to as symmetric condition),
two private values, one for each bidder, are independently drawn from a commonly known uniform
distribution. In the symmetric condition bidders have no information about the rank order of
valuations. In the second information condition (hereafter referred to as asymmetric condition),
both bidders are informed about the rank order of their valuations before bidding, whether they have
the highest or lowest valuation (but not informed about the size of the diﬀerences in valuations.)
3.2 Dual-Market Bidding Procedure
A dual-market bidding was employed. In the dual-market, bidders just submit a bid under the
symmetric condition. Then, once these bids are collected, but before they are posted, information
about the ranking of valuations is released and subjects are asked to then submit a second bid.
The winner in each market is determined after the second bid is submitted. Payoﬀs are determined
based on just one of the two markets (chosen with equal probability). Participants’ positions as
high-value or low-value bidder are determined randomly in each period.
The dual-market bidding procedure, involving the same two bidders bidding for the same item
under two diﬀerent information conditions, has the advantage of directly controlling for between-
subject variability in bidding.4 T h er u l eo fﬂipping a fair coin to determine which market to pay in
ensures that, under the expected utility hypothesis, the optimal strategy in the private information
market should be unaﬀected by bids made after the ranking is revealed, and vice-versa.
In order to determine whether the dual-market bidding procedure actually aﬀects the way
bidders bid, and to familiarize subjects with the auction conditions so as to make it easier for them
to bid in dual-auction markets, each session began with bidding in single-auction markets. For the
single-auction markets, each bidder submitted one bid in each period. Table 1 brieﬂys u m m a r i z e s
the experimental treatments. Sessions 1 and 2 began with ten periods of single-auction markets
with the asymmetric condition followed by twenty periods of dual-auction markets. During these
ten initial periods, each bidder maintained her role as a high-value or low-value bidder. Sessions 3
and 4 began with ten periods of single-auction markets with the symmetric condition followed by
twenty periods of dual-auction markets.
4A similar procedure has been used in previous auction experiments by Kagel and Levin (1986) and Kagel, Harstad
and Levin (1987).
5Table 1: Experimental Design
Experimental Sessions Auction Markets Information
Treatment Periods Condition
Asym. Condition and 1&2 1t o1 0 Single-Auction Asymmetric
Dual-Market Bidding 11 to 30 Dual-Auction Sym./Asym.
Sym. Condition and 3&4 1t o1 0 Single-Auction Symmetric
Dual-Market Bidding 11 to 30 Dual-Auction Sym./Asym.
Note: In session 1, during the dual-auction markets, only 18 trading periods (out
o f2 0 )w e r ea c t u a l l yr u ns i n c et h en e t w o r ks y s t e mb r o k ed o w na tt h a ts t a g e .
3.3 Design Parameters
This section characterizes the basic parameters and the general procedure of the experiment.
Values’ Probability Distributions. All bidders were informed that their valuations were drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval $0.00 to $6.00.
Participation Fee. Each group of players received an initial cash balance of zero. Since bidders’
roles were not changed during the initial ten auction periods of sessions 1 and 2, the low-value
bidders received an additional $5 at the end of each session. This was a ﬁxed amount that was not
expected to impact behavior.
Matching Procedure. Bidders were informed that participants would be randomly matched in
every period, but that no pair of bidders would be matched twice in two consecutive periods.
Bidders were also informed that, in the dual-auction markets section, each of them would face the
same opponent (with the same valuation) in both markets.
Information Feedback. During the single-auction markets with the asymmetric condition, each
subject received feedback about her earnings and the competing bidder’s valuation and bid. During
the single-auction markets with the symmetric condition, additional information about the ex-post
ranking of valuations was posted on the computer screens. For the dual-auction markets, each
subject received complete feedback about who the high bidder was in each market, as well as her
potential (and actual) earnings in each market, what the other bidder’s value and bids were in each
market, and which market was randomly selected to pay oﬀ in.
Dry Runs. In order to familiarize subjects with the auction procedures, two practice periods
occurred at the beginning of the single-auction markets, and one practice period occurred just
6before the dual-auction markets began.
Subjects. For each session, the subjects were drawn from a wide cross-section of students (mostly
undergrads) at the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. There were 18 subjects
for session 1 and 20 subjects for sessions 2, 3 and 4. Subjects participated in only one session. The
experiment was run in the economics lab at the University of Pittsburgh using computers.5
4 Theoretical Predictions6
LRWZ consider the speciﬁc situation where a single object is auctioned between two bidders. Both
bidders have risk-neutral utility functions and independently drawn private valuations. These val-
uations V1 and V2 are ex-ante identically distributed according to a continuous probability density,
g(v), of valuation within the strictly positive support [0,c]. G(v)i sad i ﬀerentiable cumulative
distribution function of g(v).7 G is common knowledge to bidders. Each bidder i knows whether
she has the higher or the lower valuation but does not know her opponent’s exact valuation.
Let H be the bidder with higher valuation, vH = max{v1,v 2},a n dL be the bidder with lower
valuation, vL = min{v1,v 2}. LRWZ proved that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies
that is strictly increasing with regard to the valuation. It should be noted that LRWZ’s analysis is
not trivial and works with a non-standard ordinary diﬀerential equation system.8
Under the assumption that the underlying distribution of valuations is uniform and that c =1 ,
both agents maximization problems can be reduced to the following diﬀerential equation system













5The site http://ciep.itam.mx/∼elbittar/instructions/lrwz.pdf contains the set of instructions given to subjects.
6This model presentation follows the results of LRWZ’s paper very closely.
7LRWZ also assume, as a technical requirement, that G has a Taylor expansion around zero (i.e., G(x)=αx +
βx
2 + ..., with α > 0)
8In this model, VL and VH each has a strictly positive marginal density in the interval [0,c] such that the joint
density (with a triangular support) is f(vH,v L)=2 g(vH)g(vL)f o rvH≥vL and (vH,vL) ∈ [0,c]×[0,c]. LRWZ pointed
out that since values are stochastically dependent, VH and VL c a nb ev i e w e da saﬃliated ` al aMilgrom and Weber
(1982). While for Milgrom and Weber the aﬃliation is between symmetric distributions of signals, LRWZ’s model
c a nb es e e na sas p e c i a la ﬃliated private-value model that considers a speciﬁc asymmetric distribution of signals
(triangular).
7Table 2: Numerical Results from the Equilibrium Bid Functions
Auction Sellers Typical Buyer High-Value Low-Value Proportion Proportion
Model Revenue Surplus Pr[Win] Surplus Pr[Win] Surplus Pr[Win] of POA
a of ME
b
Symmetric∗ 2.0000 1.0000 0.5000 (—) (—) (—) (—) 1.0000 1.0000
Asymmetric 2.2192 (—) (—) 1.3606 0.7103 0.2625 0.2897 0.7103 0.9565
Note: Valuations are drawn from the uniform interval [0,6]. Mean is computed by Monte Carlo using 10,000
samples of 1,000 drawings.
∗: Calculations are made analytically.
a: Pareto-Optimal Allocations: POA
b:M e a nE ﬃciency: ME =
vwin
vh
h(0) = l(0) = 0 (3)
∃ t∗ ∈ [0,1] such that h(t∗)=l(t∗)=1 ( 4 )
where l(·)a n dh(·) are the inverse bid functions of bL and bH, respectively. By l’Hˆ opital’s Rule,
h0(0) = 2 and l0(0) = 4
3.N o t i c et h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u m ,vL = l(x)w h e nL bids x, and vH = h(x)w h e n
H bids x.
A solution to (1), (2), (3) and (4) characterizes the equilibrium for the FPA, where the opti-
mal bid functions take values in the interval [0,1]. This system of diﬀerential equations lacks an
analytical solution. For a numerical approximation of the above system of equations, we follow a
general method implemented by Elbittar and ¨ Unver (2001).
The bidding response for the symmetric and independent private-value FPA model, bS,c a nb e
derived analytically. For the case of n risk neutral bidders with a uniform distribution, the unique





In Figure 1, the equilibrium bidding response for the low-value bidder and for the high-value
bidder are represented by bL and bH, respectively. In the same graphic, the equilibrium bidding
response for the symmetric and independent private-value model when n = 2 is represented by bS.
4.1 Comparative-Statics Predictions
The comparative-statics predictions of these two auction models deﬁne the theoretical benchmark
for measuring the possible impact of valuation ranking revelation on bidding behavior. These pre-
dictions also provide us with precise statements about the changes in the seller’s revenue and the













Figure 1: Equilibrium Bid Functions: bL(v)[ −·], bH(v)[ –]a n dbS(v)[ −− ]
9proportion of optimal allocations (LRWZ, 2001). First, the high-value bidder should bid less ag-
gressively than the low-value bidder for any given value (bL(v) >b H(v)). Since the low-value bidder
can obtain the item with positive probability, the proportion of eﬃcient allocations should decrease.
Second, for a number of diﬀerent distributions, including the case of uniform distribution studied
here, revealing the ranking should induce both bidders to bid higher than when this information is
not known (bi(v) >b S(v),i=l,h).9 Therefore, the seller’s expected revenue should increase.
These changes are associated with two behavioral components, both producing positive eﬀects
on the seller’s expected revenue (Maskin and Riley, 2000). One component is the “sure thing
eﬀect”: The high-value bidder must take into consideration that the low-value bidder is willing to
increase her bid in order to increase her probability of winning the object. Note that the high-value
bidder must think more deeply to formulate the right response compared to the low-value bidder.
However, if the high-value bidder does not take the low-value bidder’s more aggressive bidding into
consideration, she could be tempted to keep bidding the same, or even less, in a misguided attempt
to take advantage of her higher valuation. The second behavioral component would be the “weight
eﬀect”: Since the low-value bidder is expected to bid more aggressively than the high-value bidder,
the higher bid is weighted more in the expected revenue due to the higher probability of winning.
Table 2 summarizes some important theoretical predictions for both auction models using the
equilibrium bid functions. The seller’s expected revenue, the proportion of Pareto-Optimal Alloca-
tions (POA), the proportion of the maximal surplus − or Mean Eﬃciency (ME) −,a n de a c ht y p e
of bidder’s unconditional expected surplus and probability of winning the item are numerically es-
timated, drawing valuations from the uniform distribution in the interval [0,6]. The values used in
these results indicate that the theoretical impact of the valuation ranking revelation would increase
the seller’s expected revenue from $2.00 to around $2.22, with the percentages of POA and of ME
decreasing from 100.00% to 71.03% and 95.65%, respectively.
5 Experimental Results
This section compares the experimental results for the dual-auction markets in order to directly
measure how revealing the ranking of valuations aﬀects bidding behavior.10
9This will always be true for the low-value bidder. However, for the high-value bidder, LRWZ showed that there
exist probability distributions for which bS(v) >b H(v) for some values of v.
10As we will see in each of the following sections, the results of single-auction markets are consistent with the
results for the dual-auction markets and indicate that the dual-market bidding procedure does not to aﬀect the
10Table 3: Observed Bid Factors













Median 0.2959 0.3417 0.3228 0.1731 0.3919
Mean [0.1689] [0.3538] [0.2614] [0.2365] [0.3976]
Std. Error (0.1314) (0.0058) (0.0658) (0.0087) (0.0060)
Note 1: δ









v ,i=l,h and j =s,a.




bWH Period WL WH
11 2.5813∗ -0.6919 21 3.6463∗ -1.9848+
12 0.4422 -2.0758+ 22 2.5283∗ -0.9917
13 2.5196∗ -1.4295 23 4.0828∗ -2.8466+
14 2.8830∗ -1.7762+ 24 3.6434∗ -3.0750+
15 2.7150∗ -2.5276+ 25 2.3679∗ -1.6268
16 3.9388∗ -1.3133 26 4.0760∗ -3.6548+
17 1.5333 -3.1508+ 27 2.7678∗ -1.4697
18 2.8415∗ -3.4032+ 28 4.4288∗ -2.4496+
19 1.7637∗ -1.5098 29 2.7557∗ -0.3346
20 3.2189∗ -2.6063+ 30 2.7758∗ -2.8590+
Note: Periods 11-28 count with 39 observations each, while
periods 29 and 30 count with 30 observations each.














i against H1 at p<0.05.














i against H1 at p<0.05.
115.1 Bidding Behavior
Table 3 reports the observed bid factor, δ
j
i(v), for each type of bidder, and each information
condition. The bid factor, or relative diﬀerence between subjects’ valuations and bids, tells us how
much a bidder shaves oﬀ her own reserve value when bidding for an item.
LRWZ predict that both types of bidders bid more aggressively under the asymmetric condition
than under the symmetric condition (δS
i (v) > δA
i (v),i=l,h).
Analysis of the median of actual bid factors in Table 3 indicates that, contrary to expectations,
δS
H(v) < δA
H(v).11 For the pooled data, the high-value bidders shave oﬀ 5.0 percentage points
more after information is released. In particular, bidders with valuations less than 4 shave oﬀ 7.0
percentage points more after information is released, while bidders with valuations greater than 4
shave oﬀ 3.0 percentage points.12 Thus, high-value bidders tend to bid lower under the asymmetric
condition. By contrast, low-value bidders tend to discount less after information about the ranking
of valuations is released. For the pooled data, the same bidders shave oﬀ 12.3 percentage points
less after information is released. As expected, low-value bidders tend to bid higher under the
asymmetric condition.13
Table 4 displays, for every auction period, a one-tailed Matched Pairs Wilcoxon (Wi) test statis-
tic for each group of players type i. The null hypothesis that the bid factor for low-value bidders
under the symmetric condition is larger than or equal to that under the asymmetric condition is
rejected in all but two auction periods. For high-value bidders, however, the same null hypothesis
holds for all auction periods. In fact, in twelve of the auction periods, high-value bidders tend to
reduce their bid (or increase their bid factor) after information is released.14
bidding behavior.
11Since the mean is signiﬁcantly aﬀe c t e df o rt h ee x t r e m ev a l u e s ,w ec o n c e n t r a t et h ea n a l y s i so ft h ee x p e r i m e n t a l
data using the median instead.
12Here we check whether bids for high-value bidders increase when ranking information is revealed. According to
Figure 1, bids do not begin to increase measurably until valuations exceed 4. However, we observe bidding reduction
in the whole range of valuations.
13Looking at the median for the single-auction markets, we ﬁnd results similar to those for the dual-auction markets
− i.e., low (high) value bidders under the asymmetric condition tend to bid more (less) aggressively than bidders
under the symmetric condition. Using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test statistic, the null hypothesis that the bid
factor for the low-value bidders under the symmetric condition is greater than or equal to this factor under the
asymmetric condition is rejected. However, for the high-value bidders, the same null hypothesis is not rejected.
14The null hypothesis that the bid factor for high-value bidders in the asymmetric environment is smaller than
or equal to that under the symmetric environment is rejected in twelve of the auction periods. For the other eight
auction periods, high-value bidders also reduced theirs bids although not signiﬁcantly.
12Based on the second of the comparative-statics predictions, it is expected that high-value bidders
bid less aggressively than low-value bidders for any given value under the asymmetric condition
(bL(v) >b H(v)). In order to better assess this prediction, it is necessary to estimate and compare
subjects’ actual bid functions for the same valuation.
Analysis of the experimental data indicates a signiﬁcant pattern of heteroscedasticity with
respect to valuations, v, and heterogeneity of individual responses. Estimation of the relative
deviation with respect to the equilibrium response, dit =
b(v)−b∗(v)
v , allows us to correct for het-
eroscedasticity with respect to the size of valuations and then recover the actual bid function. We
consider the following ﬁxed-eﬀect model with groupwise heteroscedasticity:









The parameters of this model were estimated using an iterative feasible GLS procedure. The
estimated bid functions under the asymmetric condition for low-value and high-value bidders are
denoted b bL and b bH, respectively; b bS corresponds to the estimated bid function under the symmetric
condition. Figure 2 graphs each of the estimated bid functions.
Table 5 reports the mean of the diﬀerence in bid factors evaluated for the same set of random
draws.15 The mean of the diﬀerence in bid factors between low and high-value bidders, b δA
H(v) −
b δA
L(v), represents a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in bidding behavior.16 Speciﬁcally, high-value bidders
shave oﬀ their reserve value approximately 15.6 percentage points higher than low-value bidders.
Thus, for the same set of random draws, low-value bidders, on average, bid 41/ cm o r et h a nh i g h - v a l u e
bidders. This diﬀerence can be broken down into two components. The ﬁrst component is the mean
of the diﬀerence in bid factors between low-value bidders under both conditions, b δS(v)− b δA
L(v). In
particular, low-value bidders shave oﬀ their reserve value around 8.2 percentage points less under
the asymmetric condition than under the symmetric one, thus representing an additional bidding
of approximately 27/ c. The second component is the mean of the diﬀerence between the bid factors
15Valuations were drawn from the common support of the bid functions. Mean and standard error were computed
by Monte Carlo using 10,000 samples of 1,000 drawings.
16In order to assess the accuracy of the estimated bid functions, we compare the estimated bid factors using the
same set of valuations drawn in the experiment and the direct estimated bid factors available from the experiment (See
Table 3). The null hypothesis that the estimated bid factors for high-value and low-value bidders in the asymmetric
environment are each equal to those estimated in the experiment can not be rejected at p<0.05.













Mean 0.1559 0.0816 -0.0743
Std. Error (0.1155 × 10−4) (0.0558 × 10−4) (0.1651 × 10−4)
Note: δ
j
i =( v − b(v))/v, i =L,H and j = S,A.
of high-value bidders in both conditions, b δS(v) − b δA
H(v). High-value bidders shave oﬀ their reserve
value around 7.4 percentage points more under the asymmetric condition than under the symmetric
one, resulting in a lower bidding of approximately 14/ c.
In conclusion, estimates of bid functions based on the experimental data indicate that revealing
the ranking of valuations induces low-value bidders to bid more than high-value bidders with the same
valuation. This result is consistent with the comparative-static prediction of LRWZ. It also supports
our previous ﬁnding that low-value bidders tend to bid more aggressively under the asymmetric
condition and high-value bidders are inclined to bid less aggressively.
In addition to these behavioral results, which are directly related to the comparative-statics
predictions, there is a clear indication of a larger bidding variation in the response of high-value
bidders than in that of low-value bidders. Namely, the standard deviation of the bidding regression
for high-value bidders (b σbH =0 .5394) is signiﬁcantly larger than that for low-value bidders (b σbL =
0.3643).17 This result could be attributed to the greater complexity of bidding strategies for high-
value bidders once information is released. For low-value bidders, the obvious response to such
information is to increase their bids in order to increase the probability of obtaining the object.
For high-value bidders, the response is less obvious: Once high-value bidders are aware of their
strong position, they might either be reluctant to take on the risk of submitting lower bids because
of low-value bidders’ more aggressive bidding behavior or be willing to take such a risk in hopes of
increasing their average surplus.
17The standard deviation of the bidding regression for the symmetric condition is b σbS =0 .4944. The R-squared
for the recovered bid function are b R
2
bH =0 .7548, b R
2
bL =0 .9159, b R
2
bS =0 .8312.













Figure 2: Estimated Bid Functions: b bL(v)[ −·], b bH(v)[ –]a n db bS(v)[ −− ]
Table 6: Estimated Bid Functions Comparison: Numerical Results
Bid Functions Seller High-Value Low-Value
Comparison Statistics Revenue Surplus Pr[Win] Surplus Pr[Win]
b bH(v)v sb bL(v) Mean 2.5451 1.1729 0.7766 0.1000 0.2234
Std. Error (0.3244 × 10−3) (0.2997 × 10−3) (0.1104 × 10−3)
b bS(v)v sb bL(v) Mean 2.7407 0.9088 0.7763 0.1112 0.2237
Std. Error (0.4029 × 10−3) (0.3330 × 10−3) (0.1180 × 10−3)
b bH(v)v sb bS(v) Mean 2.5117 1.2655 0.8234 0.0783 0.1766
Std. Error (0.3200 × 10−3) (0.3012 × 10−3) (0.1097 × 10−3)
Note: Valuations were drawn from the common support of the bid functions. Mean and standard error were
computed by Monte Carlo using 10,000 samples of 1,000 drawings.
155.2 Do bidders proﬁtably deviate?
The baseline of the comparative-static predictions in LRWZ is what risk-neutral, fully rational bid-
ders bid under the symmetric condition. Well known pattern of bidding above RNNE in ﬁrst-price
IPV auctions (Kagel, 1995) is replicated here, as well as for both types of asymmetric conditions.
For instance, using a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Di) test statistic on the observed bids com-
pared with the theoretical bids, the null hypothesis that the observed distribution of bids, G(b),
is similar to or larger than the theoretical distribution of bids, G(b∗), is rejected for all auction
markets within each information condition at p<0.05.18
Hence, the question to be addressed next is whether there exist monetary incentives for high-
value bidders to decrease their bids rather than increase them (or at least keep them approximately
the same). In order to check whether such incentives exist, we examine whether high-value bidders
increase their average surplus by bidding based on the estimated bid function, b bH(v), rather than
continuing to use the estimated bid function previous to the revelation of the ranking, b bS(v).
In Table 6, the ﬁrst row displays the results of a Monte Carlo experiment in which high-value
bidders bid against low-value bidders, with both groups bidding based on the estimated response
functions b bH(v)a n db bL(v), respectively. The second row indicates results of a similar numerical
experiment in which high-value bidders based their bids on the estimated response before the
ranking was revealed, b bS(v). Table 6 displays, for each comparison, the seller’s expected revenue,
the bidder’s expected surplus and the probability of winning the item.
The numerical results of Table 6 indicate that, if high-value bidders were using the bid function
previous to the revelation of the ranking, b bS(v), the average surplus would also fall (by around 26/ c
per auction); however, the probability of winning the item would almost be the same. As result of
this trade-oﬀ, their average surplus, conditional on winning, would drop from $1.51 to $1.16 per
auction. Therefore, it is better for high-value bidders to drop their bids, which in fact is what they
do.
For low-value bidders, the question is whether it is better to increase their bids based on the
estimated bid function, b bL(v), rather than continuing to use the estimated bid function prior the
revelation of the ranking, b bS(v). The third row of Table 6 reports results of a numerical experiment
18This consistent pattern of overbidding behavior would not be consistent in our case with the idea of risk averse
bidders (Cox, Smith and Walker, 1988) since risk aversion would induce a more aggresive bidding behavior of both
bidders after information revelation for a given parameter of risk aversion.
16in which low-value bidders bid based on the estimated response before the revelation of the ranking,
b bS(v), but high-value bidders based their bids on the estimated bid function after information is
revealed, b bH(v). Comparing the numerical results of the ﬁr s ta n dt h et h i r dr o w si nT a b l e6 ,i ti s
clear that, if low-value bidders were bidding using the bid function previous to the revelation of
the ranking, b bS(v), they would suﬀer a reduction in both their average surplus (of around 2/ cp e r
auction) and their probability of their winning the item (of 5.0 percentage points).
As general conclusion, it can be claimed that each group of bidders improves the average surplus
per auction by properly deviating after information is released. In particular, the revelation of the
ranking provides incentives for high-value bidders to decrease their bids and to exploit new economic
opportunities. The reason of this result comes from the fact that each group seems to deviate in
the direction of a better response, which include both the equilibrium and the optimal response.19
Furthermore, a pattern of adjustment in bidders’ decision to change their bids after information
was released is observed. The proportion of high-value bidders reduccing their bids moves up
7.7 percentage points from the ﬁrst four auction rounds (48.1%) to the last four auctions rounds
(55.8%). The proportion of low-value bidders increasing their bids moves up 9.3 percentage points
from the ﬁrst four auction rounds (54.5%) to the last four auctions rounds (63.4%).
There are still two (non mutually exclusive) ways to interpret high-value bidders response
after information is released: (i) A failure to take into account low-value bidders’ response to the
revelation of the rankings. This would be consistent with most of the answers provided by subjects
about their bidding strategies once they learned their positions as a high-value bidder.20 (ii)A
reduction on bidders’ eﬀort to win the item regardless of their valuations. This would be consistent
19Usually, the baseline of comparison has been the equilibrium bid response. However, this might not be the best
response for a particular group of bidders once their opponents have bid out of the equilibrium. Using the estimated
response function of bidders’ opponents, we calculate numerically the optimal bidding response for each group of
bidders. The question we address is whether there exist signiﬁcant incentives for each group of bidders to deviate
towards the optimal response when their opponents have bid away from the equilibrium. If low-value bidders were
using the optimal bid function, their average surplus, conditional on winning, would increase from $0.45 to $0.85.
If high-value bidders were bidding using their optimal best response, their average proﬁt, conditional on winning,
would increase from $1.51 to $2.08 per auction. Therefore, we conﬁrm that in fact there exist incentives for each
group of bidders (in particular, for the high-value bidders) to move toward better responses, exploiting new economic
opportunities. However, it is uncertain whether these bidders would be able to recognize and be motivated by a small
amount of additional expected surplus per auction, especially since such additional gains might diminish the bidder’s
frequency of winning (Slonim and Roth, 1998).
20At the end of the sessions, subjects were asked to write down what their bidding strategies were once they learned
their positions as either high-value bidder or low-value bidder. Most of answers were as follow: “If I was a low I raised
my bid. While, if I was a high I lowered my bid.” Just a few participants indicated an apparently more sophisticated
reasoning: “Once I knew I was a high bidder, I usually lowered my bid. Sometimes I highered (sic) it because I knew
the other person knew they were a low bidder, so they might also increase their bid.”









a: Matched Pairs t-test. H0: pA(b) ≤ pS(b)
against H1: pA(b) >p S(b).
b: Matched Pairs Wilcoxon test. H0: pA(b)
≤ pS(b)a g a i n s tH1: pA(b) >p S(b).
∗:R e j e c tH0 against H1 at p<0.05.
with the persistent behavior of bidding above the RNNE in symmetric auctions as an eﬀort by
bidders to win the item regardless of their valuations (Kagel, 1995).
5.3 Expected Revenue
With the high-value bidders decreasing their bids, the enhanced revenue possibilities of the FPA
with the ranking of valuations revealed no longer necessarily holds; rather it becomes an empirical
question of whether high-value bidders’ decreasing bids dominate low-value bidders’ increasing bids
after information is released.
Table 7 reports the mean, standard error and median of the observed price realization for each
information condition. Each average price realization represents the observed seller’s expected
revenue for a particular information condition j: pj, j =s,a. According to LRWZ, seller’s revenue
expected to be higher under the asymmetric condition than under the symmetric condition (pA >
pS).
As noted in the statistics in Table 7, however, the mean of the selling prices under the symmetric
condition ($2.61) is slightly higher than under the asymmetric condition ($2.57). This observation
is conﬁrmed by a one-tailed Matched Pairs t-test statistic (t), the result of which is displayed at
the bottom of the same table. The alternative hypothesis that the price realization under the







a:M e a nE ﬃciency: ME =
vwinner
vh × 100.
b: Percentage of Pareto-Optimal Allocations: POA.
c: Population Proportion test. H0: MES ≤ MEA
against H1: MES(b) >ME A.
d: Population Proportion test. H0: POA S ≤ POA A
against H1: POA S(b) >PO A A.
∗:R e j e c tH0 against H1 at p<0.05.
symmetric condition is lower than under the asymmetric condition could not be accepted, showing
that the seller’s expected revenue does not always increases after information is released.21
In conclusion, the experimental data do not support the prediction that the seller’s revenue
increases after information about the ranking is released.22 As discussed, this is due to a signiﬁcant
reduction of the high-value bidders’ response under the asymmetric condition.23
5.4 Eﬃciency
Table 8 reports the following two measures of optimal allocation and economic eﬃciency: i) Pareto-
Optimal Allocations (POA), reported as the percentage of objects given to the high-value bidder;
and ii)M e a nE ﬃciency (ME), reported as the percentage of the maximal surplus that was generated
21Testing for every auction period, the alternative hypothesis that the price realization under the symmetric
condition is lower than under the asymmetric condition, H1 : pA >p S, could be accepted in just one of the twenty
auction periods at p<0.05.
22For the single-auction markets, the average price realization under the asymmetric condition is not higher than
under the symmetric condition. This observation is conﬁrmed by a one-tailed t-test. The alternative hypothesis,
that the price realization under the symmetric condition is lower than the price realization under the asymmetric
condition, could not be accepted.
23Notice that due to the signiﬁcant pattern of overbidding behavior, the average revenue for each information
condition was signiﬁcantly higher than the expected revenue at the risk-neutral equilibrium. For the dual-auction
markets, the average price realization for the asymmetric (symmetric) condition was $2.57 ($2.61). Meanwhile, the
expected revenue at equilibrium for the asymmetric (symmetric) condition was $2.22 ($2.00).
19as a result of the auction.24 Since low-value bidders generally have a positive probability of obtaining
the item, the percentage of eﬃcient allocations was expected to be lower under the asymmetric
condition than under the symmetric condition.
As seen in the calculations displayed in Table 8, the percentage of POA and ME are consistently
higher under the symmetric condition than under the asymmetric condition. This result is due to the
more aggressive bidding of the low-value bidders and to the less aggressive bidding of the high-value
bidders under the asymmetric condition. In the same table, a one-tailed Population Proportion
(Z) test statistic for each measure of optimal allocation is reported. The null hypothesis is rejected
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the eﬃciency under the symmetric condition is higher
than under the asymmetric condition.25
In conclusion, the FPA is, in the aggregate, more eﬃcient in the absence of information.26 This
result conﬁrms the prediction about the reduction of the proportion of optimal allocations.27
6C o n c l u s i o n
A ﬁrst-price private-value auction experiment was conducted in which the same two bidders had to
bid for a single item in two markets and under two diﬀerent information conditions. The purpose
of this experiment was to examine the information impact of ranking of valuations on bidding
behavior in ﬁrst-price private-value auctions.
Experimental results indicated that, after information about the ranking of valuations was
released, the two groups of bidders responded diﬀerently: As theory predicts, low-value bidders
were inclined to bid more aggressively. Contrary to the predictions of the theory, high-value bidders
tended to bid less aggressively. By properly deviating after information was revealed, each group
of bidders improved their average surplus per auction. However, while the probability of low-value
24A level below 100 characterizes unrealized gains from trade.
25Testing for every auction period, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the
eﬃciency under the symmetric condition is higher than under the asymmetric condition in nineteen of the twenty
auction periods at p<0.05.
26A result similar to the one obtained with the dual-auction markets was observed for the FPA eﬃciency under
each information condition in the single-auction markets. The percentage of POA and ME are consistently higher
under the symmetric condition than under the asymmetric condition. These results are consistent with the more
aggressive behavior of low-value bidders and the less aggressive behavior of high-value bidders under the asymmetric
condition as compared to the symmetric condition.
27Notice that for the dual-auction markets, the actual proportion of optimal allocations for the asymmetric condition
(74.80%) was higher than at the risk-neutral equilibrium (71.02%), but not for the symmetric, when the proportion
of optimal allocations (87.14%) was signiﬁcantly lower than at equilibrium (100%).
20bidders winning the item increased, the probability of high-value bidders winning it decreased.
Therefore, as expected, the proportion of eﬃcient allocations decreased with respect to the FPA
under the symmetric condition. Contrary to the predictions, seller’s expected revenue did not
increase on a regular basis because high-value bidders decreased their bids once information was
released.
Based on theoretical predictions, it was expected that both groups of bidders would increase
their bids once information is released. This expectation presumes strategic thinking from high-
value bidders: i.e., once they are aware that low-value bidders need to increase their bids in order
to obtain the item, high-value bidders will be reluctant to take on the risk of submitting lower bids.
The baseline of this prediction is that risk-neutral fully rational bidders bid under the symmetric
condition. In the laboratory, however, bidders were observed bidding well above the risk-neutral
equilibrium under the symmetric condition. Based on this, high-value bidders were willing to take
on the risk of submitting lower bids and increase their expected surplus once information about
the ranking was released. This behavior seemed to be reinforced by the fact that, by decreasing
their bids and moving in the direction of the optimal responses, bidders could still improve their
average surplus conditional on winning.
From the standpoint of a seller, these behavioral results have strategic implications.28 Contrary
to expectations, the revelation of the ranking of valuations might not produce higher revenues.
Therefore, if the seller were interested in collecting higher revenues and she had a device to commu-
nicate the ranking to certain group of bidders, she should reveal this information only to low-value
bidders.29 In the absence of such a device, however, the seller should not make the information
public.
28In a recent work, Kaplan and Zamir (2000) study theoretically the strategic use of seller information using LRWZ
as a baseline. In their work, the seller can increase his expected revenue by committing to a signaling strategy to
both bidders.
29In order to prevent a possible predatory activity in ascending auctions from the bidder who is thought to be
stronger than potential rivals, Klemperer (2000) proposed the implementation of the Anglo-Dutch auction. In this
auction format the auctioneer begins running an ascending price auction until all but two bidders have dropped out.
Then, the remaining bidders are each required to bid in a ﬁnal sealed-bid ﬁrst-price oﬀer no lower than the current
asking price. It is the case, for example, that in this auction format the seller might consider to reveal whether the
bidder who is thought to have the stronger position is participating in the ﬁnal sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction.
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